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PREFACE
My study for this thesis was begun over two years ago when I
became interested in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, especially his
Critique of Pure Reason.

I decided then to attempt an in-depth study

of his Critique in order to prepare a text for college students in
composition courses.

It was to be a text designed to help students

come to terms with some of the more perplexing problems of man's
intellectual life by providing them with the means for understanding
the structure of thought.
As it stands now, though, this is a prolegomen to that text.
It contains the essential theory for the text, but lacks sufficient
examples to make it readily accessible to the student, and it lacks the
exercises needed to give them a thorough understanding of how its
content can be applied to the routine problems of writing.
This is not a prolegomenon to a text for writers in the usual
sense.

It is not a study of styles of writing or grammar.

It is a

heuristic designed to aid the student in discovering meaning in what he
has written and in all that he will write.

It is a formal study of

the formal structure of language and the epistemology of thought.

It

is intended for the student interested in exploring the full potential
for his intellectual growth and development through writing.
Basically, I wanted to simplify Kant's work without reducing it
to an absurdity and without simply popularizing it.

I wanted to write

a text incorporating the best Kant has to offer, and write it so that
most students in composition could understand his work.
iv
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My interpretation of Kant's Critique has colored my presentation.

Many interpretations are possible, but mine is based on the

premise that his Critique is actually the foundation for what is now
known as set theory, the theory of classes or sets.
the basis of modern mathematics and logic.

Set theory is now

It seems to me that it

should also be the foundation of a theory of writing.
This text is not extensively footnoted, for most of it is
Kantian.

I cannot, at this time, sort out my ideas from his; his ideas

seem to have become mine.

I am also indebted to Ernst Cassirer's

profound study, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, although I do not
draw on it directly.

For a basic understanding of set theory, I am

indebted to Hans Reichenbach's Elements of Symbolic Logic.

In order to

avoid any major contradictions in logic, I consulted Irving M. Copi's
Introduction to Logic.

Other references used in writing this are

contained in the bibliography.
I am indebted to the members of my thesis committee for having
made the writing of this thesis a genuine learning experience.
member contributed a unique quality to my experience.

Each

John M. Herum

contributed his understanding of problems of organization and editing.
Dr. Bruce E. Teets contributed his understanding of the aesthetic
problems involved.
To Dr. Donald W. Cummings, I am especially indebted for
encouraging me to undertake my study of Kant, for being available for
many hours of invaluable discussion on the various problems I
encountered, and for his actual help in preparing this manuscript.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental function of language is to express relations.
Language that does not express relations is mere babbling.

The

relations a writer can develop are (1) ones in which he stands in
some sort of relation to things and people, (2) ones in which people
stand in some sort of relation to things and other people, or (3) ones
in which things stand in relation to other things and to people.

The

writer can choose not to include himself in any relation he creates,
but, as will be noted later even if he does not, he is still the
intellectual center of that universe,
Relations
Organization, unit and coherence characterize writing that has
well established relations between things and people.

They charac-

terize the rational order upon which man depends so much.

Every

investigation man undertakes is begun with the assumptions that
underlying the thing he is investigating is some kind of unity, that
things cohere, and that they can be organized into patterns to which
he can relate.

Since writing is a form of investigation, writing

that does not have organization, unity and coherence contradicts
man's basic intellectual assumptions.
The writer can come to know and understand the relations
expressed through language either through introspection or through
1
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the study of how other men have come to know and understand the way
their minds work.

To know and understand relations through intro-

spection is to have the mind reflect upon itself.

The study of how

other men have come to know and understand the way their minds work is
the study of logic.
When a writer is introspective, he contemplates the structure
of his mind, and attempts to discover the characteristics of his
thinking that are uniquely his own, as opposed to those characteristics
he has in common with all other men.

He determines the characteristics

of how other men think by a careful study of what they have said and
written.

The mind must look within itself for the relations that

underlie the language it uses to express itself.
To introspect effectively is difficult, for the relations for
which the mind searches are hidden under a mass of symbols and meanings
that are in a constant state of change.
and evolving.

They are constantly shifting

But it is necessary for the writer, if his writing is

to have unity, to be the most introspective of people.

Introspection

is, however, much more effective when aided by an understanding of
logic.
Formal logic is the study of the basic relations common to the
thinking of all men.

It is an ancient study which has sought to

isolate a constant, a universal--something common to the thinking of
all men in all places for all times.

In the Western world, logic has

been revised, updated and expanded with greater and greater precision
since the time of Aristotle.

And, to the satisfaction of the logician,

those relations that have been isolated have been found to be as
universal as they could want.
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This is why logic is so important to the writer.

By comple-

menting his own introspection with a study of logic, he can compare
his insight into the workings of his own .m ind with the accumulated
understanding of many men.

He should, however, be aware that logic

has not isolated all relations expressed through language.

In fact,

logic accounts for only a small part of the total complex that
represents the ultimate capacity of the mind for creating relations.
Much remains for the writer to discover, especially about the capacity
of his own mind and its uniqueness.
The major shortcoming of logic for the writer is the result of
a limitation the logician places on his study:

all the relations he

isolates must be isolated with scientific certainty; he is interested
only in valid relations, which may or may not be the meaningful
relations the writer will wish to use.

The "language" of the logician

is precise and embodies a degree of certainty not usually found in
some other realms of human experience.

There is no room for ambiguity

in the "language" he uses to express the relations he discovers.
But, whereas the logician might seem to err in attempting to
be too restrictive in achieving the degree of certainty he desires,
the writer most certainly errs in failing to understand and acknowledge
the importance of the relations the logician wishes to express.

At

best, logic provides man with negative criteria for the use of his
mind.

It can help man avoid meaninglessness in the midst of ambiguity.

Logic is a skeptical science, but it probably has good reason for
being so.
The writer who does not come to understand how relations are
expressed through language, either through his own experiences as a
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writer or through a study of logic, will never find writing a source
of satisfaction.
frustration.

He will find it, on the contrary, to be a source of

He will never be completely free from frustration, even

if he does understand how relations are expressed through language,
but he can expect to find enough satisfaction to justify his work if
he does.
Since this proposed text is devoted to the study of how
relations are expressed through language, it is devoted to the study
of a kind of logic.

It is not devoted to the formal logic taught in

philosophy, but to the logic of rhetoric.

It has much in common with

formal logic, but it is designed specifically for the requirements of
the writer.

Because it is a logic, it attempts to isolate relations

with the same degree of scientific certainty claimed by the logician
in his study, but it acknowledges the problem of content, a problem
generally ignored by the logician, though important to the writer.

Molecular Structure of Meaning
The relations that are possible to express through the use of
language are dependent upon a fixed set of intellectual mechanisms.
Traditional grammar attempts to isolate these mechanisms by defining
the parts of speech and the way in which they can or cannot be combined
into units of meaning.

Within that grammar, a simple sentence,

consisting of a subject (usually, a noun) and a predicate (a verb and
a direct object), is a sort of basic unit of meaning, because it
expresses the existence of a relation between the subject and the
predicate.
Traditional grammar, however, with its definition of a sentence,
has isolated the mechanisms used to express thought through language in
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a way that stresses the linear, inflexible dimension of relations.

It

does so at the expense of the greater, more flexible, spatial dimension
of those relations.

Adherence to that definition creates the impression

that relations are one dimensional and inflexible, which obscures
language's full potential for expression and meaning.

Adherence to it

tends to create thinking in its own image, often forcing those who
adhere to it into a simplistic and stereotyped mode of thinking.
At its best, the traditional definition of a sentence emphasizes
action and movement in writing.

It is widely used to create modern,

popular fiction that emphasizes the fast moving plot line, as found in
most detective and science fiction novels, and as found in most of the
novels that work their way into the best seller list.

Its main

liability to the novelist is that the characters in such novels are
stereotyped and the events are one dimensional.
But the human intellect is molecular and spatial, rather than
linear, in its most profound and meaningful moments.

It does not

deal with simple, distinct, one dimensional, stereotyped units of
meaning.

In its most profound moments, when it is philosophic,

aesthetic or scientific, the human mind creates molecular relations.
The speculative and inquiring mind is intent upon exploring the
multitude of possibilities within a given unit of meaning, and cannot
do this with only a linear dimension to relations at its disposal.
The traditional definition of a sentence cannot begin to account for
the complexity of the relations language can express.
Much literary criticism, for example, is devoted to exploring
the molecular structure of the greater works of literature.

According

to Joseph Frank, in his well known essay "Spatial Form in Modern
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Literature," the most significant modern literature "is moving in the
direction of spatial form. 111

Such writers as T. S. Eliot and Ezra

Pound create images that "present an intellectual and emotional complex
simultaneously. 11 2
account for.

This a linear definition of a sentence cannot

According to Frank, it is "necessary to undermine the

inherent consecutiveness of language, frustrating," thereby, "the
reader's normal expectation of a sequence and forcing him to perceive
the elements of the poem as juxtaposed in space rather than unrolling
in time. 113
The profundity of human thinking and the ability of the mind
to create complex relations is spatial also, and the only way to fully
appreciate it is to undermine the "inherent consecutiveness of
language."

The traditional definition of a sentence provides no

understanding of how this can be accomplished.
The traditional sentence emphasizes the linear dimension of
language by reducing the relation between a subject and a predicate
to a simple subject/predicate relation.

On the most simplistic level

possible within the traditional definition, the sentence is a mechanism
that contains a predicate that "says something" about the subject. 4
To "say something," the predicate must state the occurrence or
existence of something.

The following are some examples:
The sun shines.
Men hope.
The trees are green. 5

The relation between the subjects of these "sentences" and their
predicates is li,near, because nothing more than a one dimensional
relation is emphasized by the definition of a sentence.

The sun

either does or does not shine, just as men either hope or do not
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hope, and just as trees are either green or they are not green.
The traditional definition of a "sentence" is inadequate
because it can be used to identify linguistic expressions that condense
complex units of meaning into oversimplified relations, as in the
relation between "Men hope."

The predicate "hope" of this expression

"says something," but much more than is immediately obvious through
the definition of a sentence as consisting of a subject and a
predicate.

For now, it is enough to point out that it obscures the

relation existing between "men" and their "existence" and the nature
of their existence in that expression.

Man's ability to hope is but

one of the many features by which his existence is known, and the
relation between that feature and the other features of his existence
is obscured by the traditional definition.
The definition also obscures the implication that men must
"exist" if they are to hope, and that all men that "exist" must hope,
which may or may not be the case.

Some men do, and some men do not.

A molecular definition of a unit of meaning, a sentence, would be able
to account for this possibility, just as it would be able to account
for the fact that hope is a unique feature to man's existence as
opposed to the existence, for instance, of other animals.
A whole composition from a short piece of expository prose to
a book comprised of many volumes, is nothing more than the amplification of the meaning contained in a sentence.

No matter how

simple or complex a composition may be, its basic meaning can be
reduced to a sentence, if there is any meaningful degree of unity,
coherence or organization with it.

The expression, "Men hope," could

be the basic unit of meaning from which a writer could create volumes
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of writing.

In fact, volumes of writing do exist on the subject of

men and their hopes.

But poorly written compositions of any length

will obscure the relation between a sentence, its basic unit of
meaning and the composition as a whole, and this the traditional
definition of a sentence cannot account for.
To characterize its function as a unit of meaning, as a
mechanism for creating meaning, a sentence should be thought of as a
molecule of meaning, comparable to a molecule of matter.
this sense, a molecule of intellectual matter.

It is, in

It is a relatively

stable configuration of intellectual matter, perhaps the most stable
that man has to work with.
By thinking of the sentence as a molecule of meaning, it is
possible to think of a composition as composed of molecules of meaning
added to other molecules to create larger and larger units of meaning.
Or, within a composition, a molecule of meaning may be broken down
into an atomic unit, and atomic units can be broken down into subatomic and sub-sub-atomic units, ad infinitum.

This occurs because

the mind creates relations on levels of specificity or generality.
The smaller the unit of meaning, the more specific it will be, just
as it will be more general the larger it becomes.
In this sense, writing a composition on a complex subject
requires an intellectual reaction comparable to breaking down a
molecule of matter into its atomic and sub-atomic parts.

The further

the process is carried within a composition, the more unstable becomes
the material with which the writer is working.

The more unstable the

material, the more difficult the process of writing becomes.
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A composition may be written on any unit of meaning, no matter
what its level of specificity or generality.

If the subject matter is

well defined and quite specific, then it is probably . an atomic or
sub-atomic unit of meaning.

If it is broad and general, then it is

probably a molecule of meaning.

The only term available for charac-

terizing units of meaning larger and more general than a molecule is
"thing."
The problems of dealing with "things of meaning" will be
discussed later.

For now, it is enough to understand that only when

"things" are material things can their level of specificity or
generality be accurately determined.

Only when the existence of

things can be verified through the use of one or more of the five
senses, can things be identified as "things of meaning" as opposed to
molecules of meaning.

CHAPTER II

THE COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE SYSTEM

The writer writes to create a known.

He writes because he

wants to bring some order into the disorder he finds when he looks
into the unknown.

The unknown is disorder and chaos, things in a

constant state of flux.

The difference between something known and

something unknown becomes the difference between a complete and
incomplete system.

The Infinite Universe of Things
The writer is at the center of an infinite universe of things.
It is his universe of discourse.

It is a universe of material and

non-material things, a universe of things known and unknown.

If there

is one, unique function of man's reason it is to make sense of that
universe.

The writer's universe of discourse can make sense to him

and to those for whom he writes only by constructing systems from
those relations.

It is in this way and this way only that things

unknown can become known, and things known can become better known.
A thing for a writer may be a material thing, an object, a
part of the physical universe man experiences through the use of one or
more of his five senses.

A material thing about which he might write

may be the smallest unit of matter known to man (it would then be a
"small" thing), or it may be the whole earth (it would then be a "big"
thing), or it may be a thing as large as a galaxy or the very universe
10
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to which the galaxy belongs (it would then be a "very big" thing).
From the study of the atom to the study of the universe and all things
in between--each is a thing in the infinite universe of things and
potentially a subject for a writer.
But the writer does not write about material things only.

In

fact, many writers seldom write about them directly, choosing instead
to write about them as elements in circumstances, as states of affairs,
as an element in an action, an event, a deed, or some aim or objective.
A war, for inst;ance, might be a ''big" thing and, perhaps, a "bad"
thing in which any number of material things are involved.

An accident

might be an "unfortunate" thing in which many things are involved.

A

promotion in a job might well be a "profitable" thing, whereas a
college education, a student might hope, would be a "useful" thing.
A non-material thing for which a writer might find relations
may be a thought, an abstract idea or some difficult concept such as
space or time, justice, love, hate, beauty, honor or truth.

Thoughts

are "things" that may deal with things that do not exist, things which
might only possibly exist, things such as Hobbits, unicorns or elves.
The universe of things material and non-material is also the
universe of things known and unknown.

For the writer, things unknown

must become known, and things known must become better known.
unknown are things for which man has constructed no systems.

Things
Things

known can become better known by constructing better systems, for
things known are only apparently known.

The fundamental faith of the

scientist is that there is always more to know about anything in the
material, concrete, physical universe--from the constitution of the
atom to the infinitely expandable universe.

The fundamental faith of
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the writer is that there is always more to know about everything-whether of or beyond the physical universe.
The writer should understand, therefore, what it means to
"know" a thing, the difference between a thing known and a thing
unknown, and why things known can always become better known.
Knowledge of the known and unknown is knowledge of systems and how
things relate within systems.

The study .of writing becomes, then,

the study of systems.

The Whole and Its Parts
The principles for constructing systems are many and complex,
but, at the very least, a system is a "whole" thing constituted of
"parts," such that each part must contribute to the whole and stand
in some sort of relation to it, and such that the whole must stand
in some sort of relation to each and every part.
for the parts, and the parts exist for the whole.

The whole exists
The integrity of

any system must be such that, theoretically, the absence of any part
of the whole or the addition to the whole of any superfluous part
would immediately be detected by any critical, intelligent audience.
It is comparable to a picture puzzle.

If one piece of the

puzzle is missing, its absence should be immediately detected, and no
additional pieces can be added to it without distorting the "whole"
picture on the puzzle.

The integrity of any composition must be

maintained so that the absence of any essential part or the addition of
any superfluous part would immediately be detected by any critical
reader.
The infinite variety of things does not prevent man from
assuming that behind that variety there is some sort of unity.

In
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fact, man must assume that there is unity or the totality of his
experience would be meaningless.

Unity is itself only an idea.

It

is not a fact, for neither the existence nor non-existence of unity
can be proved.

No one can point to it, hear it, smell it, taste it,

or touch it, but it is as essential to human existence as anything
the existence of which can be demonstrated.
would be meaningless.

Without it, all else

Unity .is a necessary .idea.

Things--all things material and non-material--"make sense"
to man only when they constitute a system, because it is only when
they constitute a system or a meaningful part of a system that they
can begin to satisfy man's intellectual need for unity.

Man's

intellectual life, especially the intellectual life of the writer,
is dedicated to the end that completeness and the unconditional can
be found.

He is motivated in his search by his desire for unity.

The main function of systems is to create unity from the
diversity of the physical universe, but they can also be used for
other purposes.

When used to create unity within diversity, they are

"useful" in that they serve a specific end in man's intellectual life.
But they can also be used for purely speculative functions, wherein
their usefulness is questionable.
Because man's knowledge of the physical universe is irrational,
his intellectual needs are never completely satisfied.

To begin to

satisfy those needs it is necessary for him to speculate on possibilities, and the actuality becomes pale in comparison.

He creates

systems out of things that may or may not exist or ever exist.
creates systems for things that may only possibly exist.

Such

He
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systems are meaningful, but in a way different from the way in which
systems of representations are meaningful.
Man can, for instance, create a system of elves, even though
no elves have ever been experienced.

They may or may not exist.

They

may never exist, but that does not prevent man from conceiving of
the possibility of their existence.

The mind is programmed in such a

way that man can create a system of knowledge about elves by creating
classes to which they would belong if they did exist.

Classes and sub-

classes of elves could be created to include big elves, little elves,
kind elves, evil elves, meek elves, prideful elves, wealthy elves,
and poor elves, strong elves, weak elves, etc.
But, because of the characteristic of the mind that allows
man to create such systems, even though no elves have ever been seen,
the possibility that they do exist must remain open.

And since that

possibility must remain open, the possibility that elves are man-like
must remain open.

If it is possible for man to think of it, it is

possible that it may exist.

Or it is possible that it may exist, but

be different from the way in which man conceives of it.
There may, for instance, be a better way to organize the
universe of plants and animals, but thus far the scientists have found
none more satisfying than the organization which the theory of
evolution provides them.

It is flexible enough to allow, even, a

place for elves on the scale of evolution.

Controlling ideas survive

if and only if they provide man with an understanding of the actual
and the possible.
And, as with the construction of any system, the construction
of a system of elves would hav~ to be governed by some controlling
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idea, since no elves have even been seen.

The controlling idea used

to construct the system of elves above is anthropomorphic.
characteristics of humans were imposed on elves.

The

They could just as

well be fish-like, or plant-like as man-like, but elves have traditionally been thought of as man-like.
Within any system, things are related to a whole through a
single principle, a controlling idea.

The universal controlling idea

is that a whole, though indeterminant, always preceeds the discovery
of any part of that whole, and that the whole will determine the
relation between any two or more parts.

For all intents and purposes,

this controlling idea is a supposition.

It is hypothetical and

problematic.

It can only establish the possibility of unity in the

midst of diversity.

Its primary function in man's intellectual life

is to motivate and regulate it.

It is an effective motivative and

regulative agent only when and if man becomes aware of the limitations
of his reason.
A picture puzzle, for example, is controlled by the "picture"
on the puzzle.

The manner in which each piece fits together is

governed by that picture and the system through which it is constructed.
The pieces of a puzzle are not random.

Each has a place in the whole

of the puzzle and stands in some sort of relation to every other piece.
The manner in which each piece of the puzzle is cut is incidental to
the overall picture they compose.
Since there must be a controlling idea if a system is to be
constructed, man is placed in the center of the universe of things.
All things, therefore, exist--if they exist at all--in relation to
man.

This view is simple enough, but still deceptive.

It is constantly
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being subjected to philosophical disputes because of its implications:
if each thing in the universe must stand in relation to man if it is
to "exist," then man is the center of all systems and, therefore, the
center of the universe.

This view puts man in an egocentric position,

which many reject as philosophically and theologically invalid.

Such

a view does, however, provide the writer with valuable insight into
the task he faces as a writer, and it is epistemologically valid.
If man could not construct systems, and if those systems were
constructed without controlling ideas, the mind of man would be no
more than a tablet upon which things simply write their existence.
The mind would be a passive recipient of all that goes on outside the
mind.

To be an active agent, the mind must have some sort of mechanism

with which to act.

That mechanism is the one that allows man to

formulate controlling ideas and systems that relate and make sense of
the things in his universe--the material and non-material, the known
and the unknown.
Man's search for the complete picture, for unity, the complete
and the unconditional·, however, functions in his intellectual life like
the carrot dangled in front of an ass to make him move.

The only

major difference between man and the ass in this respect is that man
knows, or should know, that he will never get his carrot.

But it

leads him to make the unknown known, and the known better known.

His

desire for the carrot of complete knowledge of all things material and
non-material leads him on in his search, even though the carrot always
seems to be just out of reach.

It is his motivation.

It is his opiate;

and is so strong that he continues in spite of what may be the
hopelessness of finding it.

But it serves him well in his search
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for intellectual, psychological and physical well being.
The desire for unity--the complete and unconditional--contributes
to his way of life by allowing him to do two important things.

First,

it allows him to create systems, systems within which he can regulate
the things that make up the material world and his experiences within
that world, including the experiences of others with whom he comes into
contact.

Second, it allows him to create and regulate the possible

existence of other things and experiences.

Because he can create and

regulate his and other's experiences and possible things and experiences,
he remains the center of the universe.
Thing as Prototype
Man's understanding of what it means to "know" a thing comes
from his understanding of what it means to know what he thinks of as a
material, concrete, physical thing--anything man has or can ever
experience through the use of his five physical senses--his sight,
hearing, taste, touch and smell.

The relation between a material thing

and its attributes is the prototype of all relations and systems of
knowledge.

Man's knowledge of what he thinks of as material things is

the foundation of his knowledge of all things, material and non-material.
The difference between a material thing that is known and one
that is unknown is the difference between a material thing as man
experiences it through his five senses and a material thing as he
thinks he should be able to experience it.

A thing as man thinks he

should be able to experience it may or may not exist.

The disparity

between his experience and his thought creates the irrational state of
man's knowledge of all things.
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Man's knowledge is irrational, 6 because there is always a
disparity between what he knows and what he thinks he should be able
to know, and between what he experiences and what he thinks he should
be able to experience.

For his knowledge to be totally rational,

what he knows and experiences should be the same as what he thinks he
should be able to know and experience.
The mind of man is not a passive recipient of sense impressions,
not a blank tablet upon which the physical universe is recorded.
is an active, creative agent.

It

It receives data from the physical

world in the form of sense data, but the mind then processes that
data to give it meaning.
The mind processes data according to its program.
imposes conditions on the data it is receiving.

The program

One of those conditions

is that things must have distinctive features that man can experience
with one or more of his five senses.

Features of things furnish the

mind's program with the data it needs to function.

A thing could

have features that man could not experience with his five senses, but
he will never experience it, because his mind is not programmed to
receive the data they must transmit.

Man now knows that there are

things capable of transmitting data to which his basic five senses
cannot respond without the aid of scientific instruments.

There are,

for instance, light rays beyond the visible spectrum, sounds beyond
man's auditory capacity, and textures beyond man's tactile threshold.
But this does not change the basic observation.

In fact, it

only tends to confirm it, because the instruments man has been able
to invent for this purpose are simply extensions of his basic five
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senses.

They simply make data available to man that is beyond the

immediate range of those basic senses.
Beyond even the range of the five senses with the aid of
scientific instruments, there is still another realm of experience.
It is the realm of possibilities.

It is the realm of things that

could possibly exist, even though no man has ever experienced them.
It is, for example, possibly that there are light rays, sounds and
textures beyond those man can now experience even though the use of
his most sophisticated instruments.

No one may ever discover a way

to experience them, but the possibility that they exist must always
remain open, until it is proven that they do not exist.

They may

emanate from things man already knows, but then again they may emanate
from something of which man has no knowledge, from something man has
never experienced in any way.
The realm of possibilities is immense--infinite, for all
intents and purposes.

But, because the mind and the five senses

dictate the conditions under which a thing can "exist," no thing can
exist for man that is not a source of sense data.

The mind can

function at times without a direct source of sense data, but never
when it is experiencing a thing.

In this respect, the mind is

comparable to a computer programmed to process a certain kind of data.
Without that data, it cannot function.

Its potential for functioning

is there, but that potential will be of little or no value without
the data it requires.
Things and Representations
It is true that a thing has certain features that furnish the
mind's program with the data it needs to function, but in order to
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account for the irrational nature of man's thought, it is necessary
to assume that what man experiences as a thing is not a thing, but
something else.

It is also necessary to assume that the features of

whatever it is he experiences are not the features of a thing itself,
but are, instead, the features of something else.
Whatever knowledge man has of what he assumes are things
comes, though, from the sense data that fills his mind.

To understand

how it is that man assumes the existence of a thing from the presence
of this sense data, it is necessary to understand the nature of the
sensory experience.

Sensory Experience
The relation between a complete and partial sensory experience
of what man thinks of as a thing is illustrated in the following
diagrams.

Diagram 1 shows a model of what man thinks of as a thing,

divided into slices.

Each slice stands for a basic kind of sense

data man receives from it.

One slice is devoted to visual data, one

to textural, one to sound, one to smell, and another to taste.

To

experience that which the model represents through all of the sense
data it can provide would be to have a complete sensory experience of
it.
Diagram 2, though, presents the same model, but without the
visual data, the sense data necessary for man to see it.

A man could

still experience it without this data, but his experience of it would
not be as complete as it would be if he could see it.

A man can still

feel, hear, taste and smell what he thinks of as things, even though he
cannot see them.

Sight simply offers an additional dimension to the

total sensory experience.
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Thing

Diagram 1

Relation Between Thing
and Sources of Sense Data
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Thing
Diagram 2
Relation Between Thing
and Sources of Sense Data
Without Visibility
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Diagrams 3 through 6 again present the same model, but missing
from each is another feature that furnishes man with sense data.

In

Diagram 3, man's experience of what he thinks of as a thing is missing
textural data, so that he cannot touch or feel it.

Diagram 4 shows

the model without sound data in addition to visual and textural data.
Diagram 5 shows it without smell data, so that the only way man can
experience it at this point is through the one feature that remains,
that is, through its taste.

It can still be experienced, but not as

completely as it could up to this point.
Diagram 6 presents the model of what man thinks of as a thing
without any means of transmitting sensory data, and represents a
totally incomplete experience of it.

Such an experience is, however,

only theoretically possible, simply because it does not furnish man
with any sensory data.

It is also possible that it could be trans-

mitting data to which none of the five senses can respond, as mentioned
before.

Such a thing may exist, but, because of the way in which man

thinks of things, it does not for all intents and purposes, except as a
possibility.

Until man finds some way to experience it as a sensory

reality--through, for instance, the use of scientific instruments--it
does not exist.
The closest man can come to understanding what he thinks of as
a thing is represented in Diagram 7 in model A.

It is the same model

derived from the process of analysis carried on in Diagrams 1 through 6.
It is the same model used in Diagram 6 without the differentiated
features.

The model in Diagram 7 represents what man thinks of as a

thing as potential knowledge, infinitely potential knowledge.
realm beyond the five senses.

It is the

It is the realm of possibilities.
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Thing
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Model Bin Diagram 7, however, is a presentation of man's
actual knowledge of what he thinks of as a thing.
model used in Diagram 1.

It is the same

It was necessary to go through the process

of abstracting each of its features in Diagrams 2 through 6 to show
that underlying it is the realm of possibilities.

It is a mistake for

man to assume that what he can experience is all there is to experience,
and the only way to show it was through those diagrams.
Diagram 7 shows a thing as it might possibly be.

Model A in

Model B shows the

same thing as man experiences it, and is known as a representation.
See Diagram 8 for a further demonstration of this relation.
But, whether or not a thing exists is actually immaterial as
well as indeterminant.

All that man knows about whatever it is he

experiences is what he receives from the sense data it transmits.

In

the absence of such data, he must assume that it does not exist, unless
he is to assume that it exists as a possibility.

Since man can think

it possible to experience more than his senses will allow him to
experience, his conclusion must always be that his experience is
partial and incomplete.

This possibility is important to the human

mind because it sends him in search of more and more information in an
attempt to fill the gap between what he thinks and what he experiences.
It becomes his probe into the unknown.
Man does not, therefore, experience a thing.

He actually

experiences the sensory data transmitted by a thing that may or may
not exist.

This sensory data becomes a system of sense impressions

in the mind once it has been processed by the mind.
sense impressions is called a representation.

This system of

The possibility that a

thing may exist can only be inferred from its representation.

But,
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even then, there is nothing more than the theoretical possibility of
its existence, since there is nothing in the constitution of a
representation that can be used to confirm or, for that matter, deny
its existence.
For an understanding of the physical universe in which he
lives, man does not study things, for, as has been established, they
may or may not exist.

He studies, instead, representations, because

they are his only direct source of knowledge about that universe.

Man

does not learn more about things, but about representation by studying
their nature and constitution.

Man studies the attributes that

constitute the representations to know its nature and constitution.
Features and Attributes
Just as it is possible to distinguish between a thing and a
representation, it is also possible to distinguish between the features
of the thing and the attributes of a representation.
knows them have features.

Things as man

Representations have attributes.

if they exist, exist outside the mind.
tions exist, they exist inside the mind.

Things,

To the extent that representaFeatures exist in the sensory

realm of man's total experience as a sort of mediator between the
outer realm of possibility and the inner realm of concrete experience.
The first is the realm of things, the second is the realm of representations.
Like representations, attributes of representations exist
inside the mind.

They are the abstractions of man's sensory experience.

Like representations, attributes are inside the mind, but
representations are in the realm of concrete experience, and attributes
are in the realm of abstract experience.
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Thus, things, if they exist, exist outside the mind in the
realm of possibility.
of the sensory.

Features of things exist in the mediate realm

Representations are created by the mind partially on

the basis of the features and exist within the realm of concrete
experience.

Attributes are created by the mind partially on the basis

of the representations, and exist within the realm of abstract
experience.

Principle of Identification
An unknown thing becomes known only through man's knowledge of
the relation between the representation and its attributes.

A thing

becomes better known by knowing more of the attributes of which the
representation is constituted, and more about those attributes.
Knowledge of the thing itself--complete and unconditional knowledge of
thing--is impossible, for it is theoretically possible to know much
more about a thing than man can know from its attributes.
As demonstrated in Diagrams 6 and 7, that which can be known
about a thing does not begin to account for all that is possible to
know about it.

Complete knowledge of a thing would be, were it

possible, a complete system of all the attributes a thing has or could
ever have.

At best, a representation is always an incomplete system.

The relation between a representation and its attributes is
similar to the relation between the ratio of the circumference of a
circle and its diameter than it is to the relation of identification.
The ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter is known as
pi (11'), and is an irrational number approximately equal to 3.14159.
It is an irrational number because it can never become a "whole" number,
even though it is carried · an infinite number of places beyond the decimal
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point.

Because pi can never become a whole number, it can never be

completely known, just as a representation can never be completely
known.

Both can always become better known.
If there were no disparity between things as man experiences

them and things as man thinks he should be able to experience them,
his experience would follow the principle of identification.

Under

this principle, his experience would be the same as what he thinks it
should be.

But the possibility that this can occur is only theoretical

and can be demonstrated only through the use of some system of
symbolism, as, for example, in the following equation:

X = f.

In

this equation, the "X" stands for the idea of a whole thing, a complete
sensual experience of a thing as man thinks he should be able to
experience it.

And "f" stands for the features by which the thing

will be known, under the principle of identification.

The following

table demonstrates the relation between "X" and "f" under this
principle:

Attributes
f

Thing
X

False

False

True

True

This table demonstrates that "X" is not an unknown that will become
better known, but an unknown that will become completely known when
"f" is known.
"f."

It demonstrates that "X" has the same truth value as

Whatever is said of "f" must be true of "X" and if "f" is false,
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then "X" is false.

If "f" is true, then "X" must be true.

No other

valid relation can exist between them.
No other relation can exist between them because "f" constitutes
a complete system, the complete system by which "X" is known and
identified.

If it were otherwise, the mind would immediately respond

to the absence of data, i.e., "f" would be less than "X."

And, if

anything were added to "f," then "X" would be less than "f," which
would mean that the relation between them would be distorted.
The relation between "X" and "f" above is a misrepresentation
of the relation between a thing and its features because it constitutes
a complete system.

Man has never experienced one thing--not one in the

infinite universe of things--in this way.

A perfect, complete system

of identification can only occur abstractly, never in the world of
material things and man's experience of them.
The equation above represents the relation between a thing and
its features that man thinks he should be able to experience.

The

actual identification of a material thing as man experiences it is
invariably based on an incomplete system of attributes.

Those

attributes constitute a system of knowledge that provides man with a
representation of one thing that might possibly exist, not with the
thing itself.

Thus a thing is always identified by a mere represen-

tation of its possible existence.
The Copula
The relation between a thing and its features can be demonstrated through the principle of identification only because of the
imprecision of the mechanism used to establish the relation.
mechanism that does this is the copula.

The
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The principle of disparity actually governs man's knowledge of
things.

This principle governs the manner in which man receives sense

data and the way in which those sense data are programmed by the mind
into meaningful relations.

Those relations become part of a system in

which all the sense data received from a thing are related to the idea
of a whole thing.

The system by which the thing will be known is

complete or incomplete to the extent to which the sense data derived
from the features of the thing are complete or incomplete.
The system of features by which a thing is "known," however, is
always incomplete when it stands in relation to the idea of the whole
thing.

This is the principle of disparity.

As a result, knowledge of

a thing is actually the knowledge of a representation of the thing, or
the knowledge of an incomplete system of attributes.
Because a representation is an incomplete system of attributes,
each of its attributes is a part of the idea of a whole representation.
The only intellectual mechanism man has to establish the relation
between a part of a representation and the idea of a whole representation
is the copula.

In mathematics, the science of the ideal and abstract,

the copula is the equal sign (=).

It is used to establish the relation

between an unknown, some "X" factor, and its solution.

In the equation-

e == mc 2 , for instance, Einstein was solving for the unknown "e" which
stands for "energy."

Energy stands in relation to "mc 211 so that the

energy contained in any particle of matter is equal to the mass of that
body multiplied by the square of the velocity of light.

The relation

between "e" and "mc 2 " is simple and fundamental to all mathematical
problems, and it is established through the use of the equal sign or
copula.

Simply stated, within the equation, "e" is equaT to "mc2.

11

To
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know "mc 2 " is to know "e" or energy.

The formula becomes complex only

when an attempt is made to determine the relation between "m" and 11 c 211
and how it is to be applied to the physical universe.
Basically, the relation between "e" and "mc 211 is the same
relation established above between "X" and "f" in the equation "X = f."
But, once again, it is an ideal, abstract relation, that of identification.
In language, the relation between a representation and its
attributes can be expressed through the use of the copula is.

The

copula is establishes the relation between a representation and its
attributes, because a sentence can be an explicit statement of the
relation between them.

A representation is always expressed in a

sentence as the subject of the sentence, and the attributes of the
representation are the predicate complements of the subject.
The relation that the copula in a sentence establishes is not,
however, one of identification.
it could be.

It is only theoretically possible that

It could be if and only if is means the same as the

copula in a mathematical equation, that is, if the copula of a sentence
means "equal to."

But it should not when used to establish the

relation between a representation and its attributes.
The copula is can be used to mean "equal to," but to use it in
this way distorts the relation between the representation and its
attributes.

True, representations are known by their attributes and

only by their attributes, but, as demonstrated in Diagrams 1 through 7,
that which can be known about a representation does not begin to
account for all that is possible to know about it.

Complete knowledge

of a representation would be, were it possible, a complete system of
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all the attributes a representation has or could ever have.

At best,

a representation is always an incomplete system.
The irrational nature of man's knowledge and the principle of
disparity can be demonstrated as follows:
R = a , a , a , •.• a
1

2

3

n

In this equation, "R" stands for a representation.

The attributes by

which "R" is known are represented by a system of lower case letter
"a's" with subscripts.

The equation denotes that "R" is constituted

of an infinite number of attributes.

The sign used to establish the

relation between the representation and its attributes is the equal
sign copula.

But "R" is equal to its attributes only because there is

potentially an infinite number of them.

One less than an infinite

number would make the use of the equal sign invalid.
The relation between a representation and its attributes
presented above with symbols can be demonstrated through the use of
diagrams.

Diagram 9 presents a model of any representation from the

material world, the existence of which can be verified through the use
of one or more of the five senses.

It presents a model of a repre-

sentation before its attributes have been differentiated, that is,
before they have been analyzed as having an existence independent of
the representation.
The small broken circles represent the attributes of a representation before they have been differentiated.
attributes are only potentially attributes.

At this stage, the

Each is identified as a

potential attribute by the lower case letter "a" without a numerical
subscript.
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Representation ( "R")
Potential
Attributes
Before Differentiation

Diagram 9

A Representation Before its
Attributes have been Differentiated
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Thus far, though, the diagram seems to contradict the
possibility of a representation having an infinite number of attributes,
because the circle representing the model of a representation is
finite in diameter and can contain only a finite number of potential
attributes, whereas it should contain an infinite number of them.
The contradiction is, however, only apparent and is created by
the limitations imposed on the model.

To fully account for all of

the attributes a representation might possibly have, it is necessary
to imagine the larger circle as infinitely expandable, so that it
could include an infinite number of smaller circles representing
potential attributes of the representation.

Or the same thing can be

accomplished by imagining a circle containing an infinite nu.mber of
smaller circles, each of which would represent a potential attribute.
Again, the small broken circles represent the potential
attributes of a representation.

To the extent to which the represen-

tation will be known, it will be known by those attributes.

Those

attributes will stand for the representation.
There is only one way for the potential attributes of a
representation to stand for the representation.

They must be moved

from their place within the large circle to the ring surrounding the
large circle, as shown in Diagram 10.

This movement is the process

of differentiation, and can be accomplished only on the basis of the
sense data received from the representation by the mind of man through
one or more of his five senses.

The senses discover the existence of

attributes within a representation.

The mind then differentiates

between the sense data and the representation.
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Ring of Differentiated Attributes

Diagram 10

The Relation Between
a Representation and its
Differentiated Attributes
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Diagram 10 represents the situation within which attributes
are differentiated from a representation.

The large ring in that

diagram contains a number of small, broken circles comparable to
those contained within the circle representing the representation.
Whereas the small broken circles within the larger circle represent
potential attributes of a representation, the small, broken circles in
the large ring represents the potential for knowing the representation
through its attributes, or its potential for differentiation.

In both

cases, the number or circles in or on each is potentially infinite.
Each small, broken circle on the ring may become a differentiated
attribute of the representation, so there must be as many of them as
there are potential non-differentiated attributes.

But, once again,

the limitations of the model preclude the possibility of showing this.
To be differentiated and become a known attribute of a
representation in terms of the model, potential attributes must be
moved from the circle standing for the representation to the ring
surrounding that circle.

When this occurs in terms of the model, the

small, broken circles on the ring become small, complete circles as
shown in Diagram 11 where one potential attribute has been differentiated from the representation.

At this point, the "a" standing for

the differentiated attribute receives a numerical subscript, which,
in this case, designates that it is the first and only potential
attribute to be differentiated.

The arrow in the diagram connecting

potential attribute with the differentiated attribute simply denotes
that the attribute has been differentiated.

It stands for the copula.

But, because man's knowledge is irrational and governed by
the principle of disparity, the use of the arrow as a copula does not
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Differentiated
Attribute

Diagram 11

Relation Between a Representation
and one Differentiated Attribute ("R
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1

>
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mean that the representation and the one differentiated attribute are
equal.

At this point the relation between the representation and the

attribute can be demonstrated symbolically as,

The sign )
"a."

used as a copula establishes that "R" is "greater than"

It does not establish how much greater it is, but potentially

it is infinitely greater.
The meaning of a representation is constructed of units of

> a."

meaning contained in the basic symbolic expression, "R

These

are the units of meaning mentioned in the discussion of the traditional
definition of a sentence.

A unit of meaning can be defined as a term

denoting a representation joined to one attribute through the use of a
copula meaning "greater than."

In linguistic expressions of this

relation, the relation between a term denoting a representation and an
attribute is created by the copula "is."

If it is to be used precisely,

it can mean only "greater than," unless it is used abstractly to
establish the possibility of the principle of identity.

Only then can

it mean "equal to."
The only way to increase the meaning of "R" is to increase the
number of units of meaning by which it can be known.
meaning, "R

> a 1 " and "R > a 2 ,"

Two units of

can be joined together to form a

compound unit of meaning:
a , a

1

2

Two or more units of meaning can be added to one another in this manner
until the number of attributes by which "R" is known is infinite:
a , a , a , .•• a
1
2
3
n
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Each unit of meaning is, in effect, a molecule of meaning that can be
added to other molecules of meaning to create larger and larger
molecules of meaning, approximately, but never equalling a complete
thing or representation.

Diagram 12 shows the above process carried

to the point of

R)

a , a , a , a , a , a , a , a , a,a ,a ,a
2
3
9
10
11
12
1
4
5
6
7
8
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Diagram 12

Representation with 12
Differentiated Attributes

CHAPTER III

SYSTEMS OF KNOWLEDGE
The possibility of systematic knowledge--unity within an
infinite variety of representations--depends on man's noting
similarities among representations.

The similarity of two or more

representations is determined by the attributes of the representations:
if two or more representations have one or more of the same attributes,
then they are similar and belong to a system of knowledge.

Classification
The only systems that exist are those that classify.

Mathe-

matics and logic are systems of knowledge, but they are systems that
abstract from the systems that classify that which is the essential
structure of all systems.

They are studies that attempt to abstract

all that all systems have in common with one another.
Biological Classification
In no other field of - human endeavor has the process of
developing systems been more fully developed than in science,
especially in the biological sciences.

Biology would be meaningless

without a system for classifying animals and plants.

Over a million

different species of animals and over 350,000 different species of
plants have been identified and classified.

Each specie is classified

within a system containing seven basic levels:

Kingdom, Phylum or

Division, Class, Order, Family, Genus and Species. 7
46
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An animal or plant is a member of one or more of these levels
according to specific, physical features.

The hierarchy of which the

system consists is designed to provide specific kinds of information.
Its formation is governed by a principle or controlling idea.

Early

systems of biological classification were governed simply by a
principle based on the purely specific, physical features of animals
and plants.

They were classified according to their form and structure.

Only those features that could be observed, the obvious and the
physical, were used.

Each class of plants and animals was constructed

on the basis of large numbers of empirically associated features. 8
Early systems were similar to the system a gardener might use
in planning his garden.

Flowers can be classified according to how

tall they grow, or according to their color.

A gardener would like to

know how tall flowers grow in order to know which flowers to put in
the front of his garden and which to put in the back.

He might also

want to vary the colors of the flowers at various points within his
garden.

The principle governing his planting is similar to that used

by biologists in earlier systems.

The demands, however, of biologists

have evolved far beyond those satisfied by the earlier system.
The modern system of classifying animals and plants is based
on the principle of phylogeny, that is, according to the evolutionary
development of an animal or plant.

The physical features of animals

and plants provide the criteria for assigning a plant or animal to a
class.

The hierarchy, the position of a plant or animal within it, is

designed to establish the position of a plant or animal within the
scale of evolution.

The system automatically encodes this information.

As such, it provides the morphologist with morphological information,
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the physiologist with physiological information, and the ecologist with
ecological information. 9
Outside the realm of the physical sciences, though, little has
been done formally to establish systems.

Systems are not the sole

concern of the scientist, but they do tend to be neglected in all but
the most formal of disciplines.

Writing, for instance, is funda-

mentally the process of creating systems, but little exists in the
literature on writing on how a system is created with writing.

Few

writers are probably actually aware of how extensively they draw on
the theory of systems when they write.
Informal Classification
Even less often is the "average" man aware of this.

Seldom is

he aware that he classifies just about everything with which he comes
into contact.

He does it, though, and for the most part, without the

benefit of knowing how it is he does it or can do it.
systems are invalid.

So many of his

Many of them oversimplify the nature of his

experience and lead him into believing things for which there is no
basis.
That so much of human thought is devoted to creating systems
becomes evident when questions of the following type are answered:
1.

"What gives you the most pleasure?"

2.

"What do you like to eat?"

3.

"Where would you like to spend your vacation?"

4.

"What subjects in school do you like the best?"

To answer any one of these questions would immediately force an
individual into classification.

Each question stipulates a class or
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classes from which the individual would have to make a selection.

To

make a selection, the individual would have to first consider each and
every member of each class stipulated by the question.

Then, according

to his predilection or some controlling idea, he would select the one
most suited to him.
Before responding to the first question, he would have to
consider as many things as there are that give him ~leasure.

From

those things which give him .pleasure, he would then select the one
thing that gives him the most pleasure.

In responding to the second

question, from the class of things he eats, he would have to select
the things he likes to eat.
a class.

The things he likes to eat would then be

From the class of places where he might spend his vacation,

he would have to select the place where he would most like to spend it.
From the class of subject he takes at school as stipulated in question
four, he must select the ones he likes most according to his
predilection.

He may like only one subject or none, but he must

still respond to the question from within a class.
No other form of communication quite throws an individual back
on his dependence on systems more than does the question.

It is,

perhaps, for this reason that questions are so taxing.
A class becomes a sort of concept that allows learning and the
application of that learning.

Classes collect the distillate of man's

experiences into concepts upon which he may call in the future.
learns the attributes of things by experiencing them.
instance, experience a tree.

He

He may, for

He may have only one confrontation with

a tree, but the distillate from that experience is enough to create a
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class upon which he may call in the future in any confrontation with
any other three.
A man confronted with a tree abstracts from it its critical
attributes.

Those critical attributes constitute the distillate of

his experience.

Repeated confrontations with members of the class of

representations called "trees" creates a stronger and stronger
distillate.

Infrequent confrontations tend to dissipate it. ·· · A man

may even lose all the distillate from his confrontation and not be
able to identify a tree after a lapse of time.

Or he may be able to

identify a tree from the distillate of previous experiences, but fail
to remember the name by which that representation is known.
Determining Class Membership
To differentiate the attributes of a representation from the
representation as demonstrated previously is to define the representation.
belongs.

To define it is to discover the class or classes to which it
Establishing a representation's membership in a class or

classes automatically places it within a system.

The process by which

a representation becomes a member of a class is the prototype for the
process necessary for anything material or non-material to become a
part of a system.

Every experience man has, therefore, must be treated

as if it were no more nor less than a representation.

As a result, the

basic unit of all meaning, the relation between "R" and an "a" as
expressed in the equation "R)

a," is the basic unit of meaning for

all of man's experiences, whether of material or non-material representations.
An intellect that does not differentiate between one representation and another, and that does not acknowledge the difference
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between a representation and its attributes, passively accepts a
disorderly and undifferentiated universe.

An individual totally

passive to his experiences would drive through a neighborhood and not
even be aware of any of the houses.

He might not even be aware that he

was in one neighborhood as opposed to another.

He would not be in

contact with "reality."
Every individual is confronted with a multitude of representations of all kinds every waking moment.

The mind, however, has the

power to differentiate only a small part of all that it is confronted
with, so differentiation is selective.

If, for example, a man were

driving through a neighborhood, he might differentiate between one
house and another on the basis of the house numbers.

Another man might

differentiate the same neighborhood on the basis of the way each house
is landscaped.

Another might do it on the basis of the kinds of

automobiles in front of each house.

An individual totally committed to

differentiation might try to differentiate between one house and
another, using as many different standards as he was intellectually
equipped to use.

But, even then, he would not be able to totally

differentiate the neighborhood, simply because there are so many other
ways he might do it, ways for which he is not intellectually equipped.
To attempt to do it with as many different standards as he was intellectually equipped to use would be intellectually exhausting.

Differen-

tiation must, therefore, be selective.
But the closer an individual comes to totally differentiating
his universe the more sophisticated will be his intellectual life.

A

totally undifferentiated universe would reflect a total lack of intellectual life.

The reason for this is that differentiation is contingent
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upon a pragmatic need that can be satisfied only by a differentiated
universe.

The degree of the intensity of the need regulates the drive

to differentiate.

The absence of differentiation in the intellectual

life of an individual suggests the absence of any intense psychological
or intellectual need.
Differentiation
Analysis begins with perceiving that the attributes of a
representation can have a status of their own, separate and independent
of the representation.

Rather than emphasizing the dependence of the

attributes on the representation, we should emphasize the dependence of
the representation on its attributes.
Nothing can be stated about a representation until its attributes
have been differentiated, except that it "exists."

Its "existence" is

no more than a basic awareness of its presence and provides no knowledge
of it, except passive knowledge.

Only out of an awareness of the

"existence" of a relation between a representation and its attributes-an active confrontation with the representation--does the representation take on meaning.

When a representation is itself, it remains in

a pre-analytic, undifferentiated state of being.

When it is something

else, it has been differentiated and becomes an object of knowledge.
It is something else only when its attributes have an existence
independent o! it, so its attributes become the condition for its
existence.
To determine a representatibn's ' membership in a class, as many
of its attributes as possible should be differentiated.

Then, depending

upon the controlling idea under which the system is being created, those
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attributes that seem to most adequately define the representation are
selected out of all that have been differentiated.

Those attributes

will be the basis of the process of classification.

Constructing a System
To the extent that man can construct systems, he can through
the use of units of meaning.

The prototype for the structure of that

mechanism is the representation, that is, the relation between a
representation and its attributes.

In mathematics, that relation is

expressed in an equation as the relation between the unknown "X"
factor for which the mathematician solves, and the solution to the
equation, that by which the "X" factor will be known.

In writing, the

act of creating systems through the use of language, the relation
between the representation and its attributes is expressed through the
use of a sentence, defined as a subject, a copula and one predicate
complement.

In all three cases, the basic unit of thought consists of

an unknown, a copula, and that which is known, as shown in the diagram
below:
Unit of Thought

Unknown

Representation
Equation
Sentence

Representation
"X"

Subject

Copula
~ 10

=

is

Known
Attributes
Solution
Predicate
Complement

Since the relation between a representation and its attributes is the
prototype of the unit of thought, it is possible to demonstrate the way
in which systems of knowledge are constructed in terms of a representation, such that all that is stated about representations is applicable
to the function of the other units of thought in constructing systems.
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Classes Defined by Attributes
As has already been demonstrated, a representation stands in
the following relation to its attributes:
R =a, a , a , .•. a
1
2
3
n
The meaning of "R" is composed of units of meaning, that is, from units
composed of "R" and "a" expressed as "R

> a."

To fully express "R,"

an infinite number of units must be combined through some sort of
process of conjunction.

But one unit of meaning is sufficient to give

some meaning to "R," just as one unit is sufficient to place it within
a system.
Diagram 13 is the same basic diagram used in demonstrating the
relation between "R" and "a."

But the act of differentiation--to move

potential attribute of a representation from the circle that represents
it to the ring surrounding it--creates an intellectual effect far
greater than simply establishing the independence of the attribute.
The new significance of the act is demonstrated in Diagram 14, which
shows an enlargement of the differentiated attribute surrounded by the
open circle with the arrows in Diagram 13.
The differentiated attribute shown in Diagram 14, has a
characteristic it did not have formerly.

The circle that represents

it is filled with many smaller, broken circles which stand for the
members of a class.

The circle that formerly stood for the attribute

of a representation no longer does so.

It stands for the class to

which the representation belongs by virtue of its having an attribute
common to all the other members of that class.

Attribute "a

1'

"as

shown in Diagram 14, is no longer a separate, distinct entity by which
the representation is known.
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Diagram 13
Attribute

11
to be Enlarged
1
in Diagram 14
11

a
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Ring of Differentiated
Attributes

Representation ("R")

Diagram 14
Enlargement of Diagram 13
(4x) to Show Relation
Between a Representation
and its Class Membership
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A representation is not, then, known by its attributes, but by
its membership in a class or classes to which it belongs by virtue of
its having the attribute required for class membership.

But it can

also be a member of an infinite number of other classes.

Just as a

representation has infinite number of potential attributes that can be
differentiated, it can belong to a potentially infinite number of
classes, one class for each potential attribute.
Th~ ring surrounding the representation in the diagram does
not, then, present only the potential for the differentiation of the
representation.

It presents the potential for the class membership of

a representation, so there must be potentially an infinite number of
circles on that ring.

The only thing preventing it in the diagram is

the natural limitations of the model; that is, it is finite.
But the number of classes to which a representation may belong
is infinite, even if the number of its known attributes were only
finite.

The irrational nature of human thought and the principle of

disparity demands this to provide classes to which no known representation may belong.
bility.

Classes without members create the realm of possi-

There may, for instance, be a class of representations with

the attribute of "brillig," although no one has ever experienced such a
representation.

Any representation with that attribute must belong to

that class, even though that representation has never been nor ever will
be experienced by man.
The meaning of the copula used to establish the relation
between a representation and its attributes has, therefore, a meaning
different from the one formerly ascribed to it.

The symbol )

now

means "greater than" the membership of a representation in less than an
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infinite number of classes.

In terms of symbols, "R) a" means that

"R" is greater than its membership in class "a."
its membership in class "a

1'

It is greater than

a, a, etc." up to and including infinity.
2

3

Binary Function
A representation either has or does not have a specific
attribute, and either is or is not a member of a class, depending upon
whether or not it has the specific attribute necessary for membership
in that class.

There are no halfway measures for determining whether

or not a representation has a specific attribute, or for determining
whether or not it is a member of a class.
This reveals a basic mechanism of the mind needed to construct
systems.

The mind is binary, or two-phased.

All units of thought are

either affirmed or negated; they are either true or false, right or
wrong.

There are no other possibilities, and from this basically

simple mechanism all that is complicated and complex in man's intellectual life is developed.
A representation either has or does not have a specific
attribute.

The problem is determining which attributes a represen-

tation actually has.

Determining the attributes of a material represen-

tation is, however, slightly less of a problem than determining the
attributes of a non-material representation.
material things are empirically demonstrable.

The attributes of
That is, a material

thing either has an attribute or it does not, depending upon whether or
not its attribute can be confirmed through the use of one or more of the
five senses.

If the means of confirming such an attribute are well

established, then the problem is greatly diminished.
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In biology, for instance, an animal either is or is not a
member of the class "species" depending upon whether or not it can
interbreed with other members of that class.

Varieties of house cats

belong to that class because they can interbreed.

So, in order to

belong to that class, an animal must be able to interbreed with other
members of that class.

If they cannot, then they are not members.

basic process is as simple as that.

The

The only difficulty would arise

if there were problems in determining if a particular animal could or
could not interbreed with other members of the class.

Though unlikely,

it is possible.
If someone were confronted with a large number of representations
to be grouped into some sort of order, then the differences between the
attributes of the various representations would be ignored; only the
similarities would be noted.

A teacher, for example, might be looki ng

for a way to group students and decide to do it according to how many
have a specific, verifiable grade point average.

Whatever other

differences exist between the students would be ignored.
either has it or does not!

A student

The reason the teacher had for wanting to

group the students would be the controlling idea for the construction
of his system.
A representation, then, either has a particular attribute or it
does not.

If it has a particular attribute, it is a member o·f a· class

of other representations having the same attributes.
in that class is automatic and unquestioned.

Its membership

Its membership is

automatic because of the structure of thought, and its membership is
unquestioned because it must have been determined that it has the
particular attribute that automatically places it within a class.

No
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room for qualification exists, therefore, in determining the membership
of a representation in a class.
But qualified responses do exist in human communication.

This

"

does not, however, negate the fact that all basic units of thought are
unqualified.

It simply demonstrates the wide range of complicated and

complex thought patterns possible through the use of a simply binary
mechanism.
Qualified units of thought are created by the juxtaposition of
two or more units of thought through the use of "but" or some linguistic
equivalent.

This word is the basic sign of qualification, and is a

major component of such phrases as "yes, but •••. " or "no, but •.•. "
"But" creates a qualified unit of thought within a system by
qualifying an unqualified unit of thought with another unqualified unit
of thought.

If, for instance, "R

thought in "R) a

II

is qualified by "R) a

1

that "R

>a

II

> al, but R > a2,

and "R ') a

II

the unit of

This statement suggests
2
are contradictory, at least in part, or

2
that they are partly mutually exclusive.
1

.

II

II

In other words, the statement

maintains that "R" cannot have both the attribute "a" and "a" and
1
2
belong to the two different classes in which these attributes gain it
membership.
This may occur for one of two reasons.
"a" or both is not an attribute of "R."
2

It may be that "a " or
1

If this is the case, the two

units of thought cannot qualify each other because one or the other or
both are false, that is, invalid units of thought.

They cannot be

contradictory nor mutually exclusive in any of these cases, because no
valid system can be created from invalid units of thought.
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The other way in which this can occur is to assert that a
representation's membership in one class automatically precludes its
membership in another or any other class.

In this first case, the

only way a representation can be precluded membership in a class is for
it not to have an attribute which entitles it to membership in that
class.

If it has an attribute which entitles it to membership in a

class, then it is a member of that class no matter what other classes it
belongs to.

Its membership in one class can never automatically

preclude its membership in another.

The only way to preclude its

membership from a class is to assert and establish that it does not
have the attribute necessary for membership.
Sub-Classes
It has already been established that a representation can have
two or more--infinitely more--attributes.
"R )

a , 11 but that also
1

11

R

>

a

11

2

To assert, then, that

does not contradict this possibility.

What actually occurs is that "R" becomes a member of a sub-class known
as

f

J,

a , a
as shown in Diagram 15. In this diagram, the same basic
1
2
diagram as Diagram 14, another ring has been added to the one already
existing.

The small, broken circles on this ring stand for the sub-

classes to which a representation may potentially belong.

The two

classes represented by the two complete, small circles on the inner,
designated as

11

a" and "a II are connected to one of the small circles on
1
2
the outer ring. Whereas, all of the other circles on the outer ring are

broken, the one designated as [a , a } is complete. It is complete
1
2
because its potential for becoming a class with members (at least one)
has been actualized.

The lines connecting "a

signifies that process has been completed.

II

1

and

11

a 2 11 with (a 1 , a 2 }
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Rings of Differentiation.

a

-1

I

I

I

I

I

Representation {"R")

Diagram 15

Representation~s Membership
in Sub-class {a , a
2
1

J
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If, for instance, "R" stands for a house cat, it is a member
of the class

11

a

11

1

that can interbreed.

Its ability to interbreed is a

differentiated attribute that entitles the representation, house cat,
membership in class

11

a • 11
1

The same cat may have a short tail, as

distinguished from other cats that are members of "a" that may have
1

medium or long tails.

For this reason, any house cat may be a member

of "a 1 ," but it is also a member of "a 2 ."

Its membership in one does

not contradict its membership in the other.

A contradiction would

be possible only if a particular house cat did not interbreed and did
not have a short tail.

Because the house cat in question interbreeds

and has a short tail, it belongs to sub-class

fa

1

, a )·

2

Possible Classes
The binary system of affirmation and negation also holds true
for determining possibilities of class membership.

In the example

above, there may be no known examples of short-tailed cats that do not
or cannot interbreed.

But, since the possibility that the equal and

opposite of any class exists, it must be possible, though perhaps not
probable, that such a cat exists.

The possibility of the existence of

such a class must either be affirmed or negated.

The very constitution

of the mind, however, demands that that possibility be affirmed,
although man's experience of the animal world can contribute nothing but
negation.

This is one of the reasons man's mind can function inde-

pendent of the sense data he receives from representations.
It is also possible through the use of the binary system to
affirm or negate the possibility of the existence of a class for which
there are no members, as, for example, the class of representations with
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the attribute "brillig" mentioned before.

The structure of human

thought is such that a class of "brilligs" may exist.

Whether or not

its existence is to be affirmed or negated is dependent upon man's
experience.

If he has never experienced any representation with a

"brillig" attribute, he will negate the class.

He must, however, no

matter what his experience has been or will be, affirm the possibility
that one exists, unless he treats possibility agnostically, that is, as
a null state of mind.
A material representation, as mentioned earlier, is the prototype of all representations, because of the relations between a material
representation and its attributes.

That same relation is basic to all

knowledge, for knowledge is the knowledge of a representation, material
or non-material.

The materiality of a representation does not· in' ci.hy· ·

way lessen or increase the relevance of the basic relation to man's
understanding.
The basic unit of all thought--an unknown, a copula and a
known--is derived from the relation between a representation and its
attributes.

Because its application to thought is so essential and

universal, it can be thought of as a vehicle for conveying meaning, and
meaning is knowledge.

It matters not what meaning the vehicle conveys.

It bears the full weight of human understanding regardless of the
materiality of the meaning.

It can bear garbage as well as it can

bear pure gold.
Because it is so universal and immanent in all thought, it is
possible to study non-material representations and arrive at the same
conclusions derived from the study of material representations, but the
difficulties are extreme.

The basic unit of thought can be too easily
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misused, even when dealing with material representations.

It is only

too easy to assign to a material representation attributes it does not
have.

When used to convey information about non-material represen-

tations, its misuse invariably distorts the relation between the
representation and its attributes.
An idea, for instance, is a representation, and could be
analyzed in the same way as a material representation can be analyzed,
as Plato and many other philosophers have attempted to do.

But the

relation between an idea and its attributes is never certain, because
there is no way to demonstrate that a specific representation has any
specific attributes.

The attributes of a material representation either

can or cannot be demonstrated through the use of one or more of the
five senses.

If they can; then they constitute the representation.

they cannot, then they do not.

If

It is as simple as that.

Detennining whether or not a specific non-material representation such as an idea has an attribute, a specific attribute or any
attributes, is a different matter.

There are simply no guidelines for

determining whether or not a representation of this sort even has
attributes.

The regulative function of the mind's program, working

with the distillate of experience, can create systems that have all the
characteristics of knowledge, but none of the content of knowledge.
Systems can be constituted of non-existent as well as extstent representations, and make "sense."
A system can be created simply by affirming or negating that a
non-material representation has or has not a particular attribute.

The

representation is an unknown that will become known only when its
attributes are known.

A copula will establish the relation between the
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unknown and the known.

The idea of justice, for instance, is an

unknown which can become known, or a known which can always become
better known.

To the extent that justice will be known, it will be

known as the total of all the attributes of which it is constituted.

To

become known, it must be known through the formula R= a , a , a ... , a .

1

2

n

3

Knowledge of it will be constituted of units of thought, that is,

"R) a."
To become "R) a ,
1

11

justice must possess the attribute "a " and
1

will possess it only by affirming that it is demonstrably an attribute
of "R" or justice.
may be defined as

It either is or is not.

Ila II
1

II

or not

If it is not, then justice

The meaning of justice will be

built up of such units, though the ultimate meaning is unknowable.
defining justice, "a" might be "equity."
1

and "a" might be "law."

In

"a" might be "fairness,"
2

If it is, then "justice is equity, fairness

3

and law" would be a definition.

The problem is, though, that justice is

not really defined by these attributes.

The meaning of each is

contingent upon other definitions.
The problem arises because it is impossible to establish that
the attributes above belong to justice.
used to establish them.

None of the five senses can be

One man can assert that they are the attributes

of justice, but another might just as easily and with just as much good
reason assert that justice is not "equity," "fairness" or "law."

He

might just as easily assert that justice is a "lie," a "farce," a
"black eye," or even something totally nonsensical, such as "justice is
a barrel of cold pickles."

This last definition satisfies the

requirement for an unknown that will become known when its attribute or
attributes are known.

In this case, the "R" is "justice,'' and
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attribute "a" is "a barrel of cold pickles."
1

It is the only attribute

at this point by which "R," justice, can be known.
The absurd is not, however, necessary to discover and understand the basic problem.

The only criteria available for determining

the validity of a differentiated, non-material representation are
negative.

There are no positive guidelines like the ones for deter-

mining the validity of a differentiated, material representation.

All

systems--whether of material or non-material representations--are
invariably incomplete and conditional, but differentiated non-material
representations fail to mee_t two major criteria for any system:

first,

any part or attribute of a non-material representation can be removed
from the system that constitutes the representation without changing
or distorting the whole representation.

Second, many other parts or

attributes can be added to it without distorting it.
In the first case, the constitution of a non-material representation is such that its existence is not necessarily contingent upon its
having one attribute as opposed to another.

For one person, such a

representation may be constituted of one or more attributes, whereas,
for another person, it may be constituted of attributes completely
contradictory to those held advocated by another.

One is as right or

wrong as another, for all intents and purposes, because neither can be
proven right or wrong.

When confronted with a material representation,

two people may disagree over the constitution of that representation,
but their disagreement can always be resolved by simply experiencing it.
One or the other of them must be right and the other wrong, unless both
of them are wrong.

One or the other is right and the other wrong if and
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only if one or the other has properly defined the attributes of the
representation.

Both may have improperly defined them.

Because the attributes of a non-material representation can
neither be affirmed nor negated, experienced to be or not to be an
attribute of a representation, they have been and are and will continue
to be subject to endless dispute.

If the existence of a representation

is dependent upon its attributes, and its attributes cannot be verified,
the representation may or may not exist.

And if its exists, there is

no guarantee that there will be any significant universal agreement on
its meaning.

Although arguments about the constitution of non-material

representations is the basis of most philosophical inquiry, to argue
about them as existent or non-existent is epistemologically invalid,
and to argue about them as if they were one or the other is the source
of never-ending frustration.
But non-material representations cannot be avoided in any
argument of any consequence.

They are important to the intellectual

life of man because they operate as man's intellectual probes into the
unknown, into the universe of possibilities.

It is a universe rich

with intellectual satisfaction, and a universe much more satisfying in
many ways than the one in which all either is or is not verifiable.
Knowledge itself, therefore, constitutes a never-ending dilemma.
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FOOTNOTES

lJoseph Frank, The Widening Gyre: Crisis and Mastery in Modern
Literature (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1957, p. 8.
(Originally published in The Sewannee Review: "Spatial Form in
Modern Literature," Vol. LIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1945), No. 3
(Summer, 1945), No. 4 (Autumn, 1945). I am indebted to Dr. Bruce
Teets of my committee for pointing out the relevance of this
essay to my thesis.
2rbid., p. 10.
3rbid.
4Richard M. Weaver, Rhetoric and Composition (New York:
Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p.164.

Holt,

5rbid.
6 r am indebted to Dr. Donald Cummings of my committee for this
distinction. I was prepared to use the term "transcendental"
rather than "irrational" to designate this kind of knowledge,
which would not have adequately described the intellectual
phenomenon involved here.
7william T. Keeton, Biological Science (New York:
Company, Inc., 1967), p. 704.

W.W. Norton

&

8rbid.
9 rbid., p. 705.
lOThis sign means "equal to or greater than." The attribute(s) of
a representation can be "equal to" the representation only when the
relation is that of identification. In all other cases, the
representation is "greater than" its attribute(s).
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